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INTRODUCTION 
Macro-regional strategies of the European Union (EU) are a relatively new feature of the 
EU’s toolbox to foster territorial cohesion, one of the Union’s core objectives since the 
entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009. The strategies aim at developing a 
space-based “integrated framework” (European Commission, 2013a, 2) for collective 
action with a view to improving functional cooperation in areas such as the transport 
infrastructure, economic development and protection of the environment across 
political boundaries. Presently, there are two EU macro-regional strategies ‘in 
operation’: the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR), endorsed in 2009, and 
the EU Strategy for the Danube Region (EUSDR) of 2011. Other (potential) EU macro-
regional strategies, such as the ones for the Ionic-Adriatic basin, the Alpine and the 
North Sea regions, are currently under different stages of development.1 
According to the working definition proposed by the then EU Commissioner for Regional 
Policy, Pavel Samecki, macro-regional strategies cover geographical areas that include 
“territory from a number of different countries or regions associated with one or more 
common features or challenges” (European Commission, 2009). Following consultations 
with macro-regional stake-holders, the Commission eventually identified priorities 
within broader ‘pillars’ or ‘objectives’ that embrace, in the case of the EUSBSR, the aim 
(1) to save the sea; (2) to connect the region; and (3) to increase prosperity.2 Each of 
these identified priority areas (PAs) and horizontal actions (HAs), such as PA Energy and 
HA Sustainability – the latter cutting across all priority areas – is under the leadership of 
one or two Priority Area Coordinators (PACs) or Horizontal Action Leaders (HALs). 
Altogether there are approximately 20 PACs in the EUSDR as well as 40 PACs and HALs 
in the EUSBSR, a unique feature of the latter (see table 1). 
The European Union emphasizes that macro-regional strategies will neither be 
accompanied by new institutions, nor new legislation or new funding – the so-called 
three ‘No’s’. Hence, the governance architecture of macro-regional strategies builds, by 
and large, into existing structures of EU governance linking the strategic, operational 
and implementation levels closely together. The governance architecture encompasses 
EU institutions as well as EU member states, partner countries, international 
organisations, subnational authorities and private actors through the High Level Group 
as the EU level as well as National Contact Points, Priority Area Focal Points, Priority 
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Area Coordinators, Horizontal Action Leaders, Flagship Project Leaders and other bodies 
in charge of implementing programmes/financial instruments at the (sub-)national level 
(for roles and responsibilities, see EUSBSR Task Force, 2013). 
Within this governance architecture, Priority Area Coordinators (PACs) and Horizontal 
Action Leaders (HALs) present rather unique features (see Gänzle and Schneider, 2013). 
The primary role of PACs and HALs is to “[f]acilitate involvement of and cooperation 
with relevant stakeholders from the entire macro-region” (EUSBSR Task Force, 2013, 9 
and 10). The system of PACs and HALs capitalizes on the promotion of sectorial 
interdependence and ties across various national and subnational governments; because 
of this it is being framed as one if not the “key to the future success of macro-regional 
strategies” (interview with Swedish government official, July 2, 2013). Its high degree of 
flexibility introduces new forms of ‘experimentalist governance’ that provide a testing 
ground for future practices and ways of interaction.3 
It is the aim of this briefing note to report the core findings of an online survey 
conducted in summer/fall 2013. The survey aimed at uncovering the internal dynamic of 
the PACs/HALs governance architecture and mapping the role, main tasks, patterns of 
inter-organizational contacts and self-perception of PACs and HALs in the EUSBSR and 
EUSDR. Building on this unique set of data drawing on information provided by 31 
BSR/DR PACs and HALs in total, it explores the support that ‘home institutions’ provide 
to PACs and HALs; how PACs/HALs work and to whom they are ‘leaning’ in terms of 
contact patterns and which policy preferences and arguments these actors support or 
are more inclined to follow, but also how they perceive of important challenges and 
opportunities posed by EU macro-regional strategies. Although – or precisely because – 
the macro-regional governance architecture for the time being not only is a moving 
target, but also relatively recent endeavor, it is important to come to grips with these 
organizational dynamics precisely at such early stage: First, from the perspective of 
historical institutionalism, newly established organizational structures tend to pave the 
ground for future avenues of development of new institutions, norms and practices 
(‘path dependency’); it is therefore important to understand the impact that PACs and 
HALs of the ‘first generation’ trigger for the future design of macro-regional strategies in 
general. Second, assuming that the basic demographic profile of PACs and HALs shapes 
basic features of their decision-making behavior (see Meier and Nigro, 1976) and that 
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the preferences of officials is likely determined by the interests of the respective societal 
groups from which they originate (see Wise, 2003), it is paramount to better grasp their 
personal and professional background.4 
Drawing on these assumptions, we expect, first that the PACs/HALs have significant 
potential of forging closer relations amongst EU-level actors (various Commission DGs), 
stake-holders and governments as they build on sectorial links and interdependence. In 
addition, the system by which two PACs – one from an old and one from a new EU or 
partner country are ‘twinned’ (e.g. DR PA 9 Moldova and Austria, see table 1) – may also 
trigger mutual learning effects on administrations at national and/or (sub)national level. 
Second, we would expect PACs/HALs to function as facilitators for improving (cross-
)sectorial integration of policy areas (horizontal integration) across several levels of 
governance encompassing the European, EU member and partner countries as well as 
subnational levels (vertical integration). Thus it may be possible to regard PACs/HALs 
as a new type of civil servants/officials operating as part of a highly flexible and 
increasingly networked bureaucracy across borders. For the time being, however, our 
findings suggest that PACs/HALs are still facing severe constraints in living up to these 
potentials in terms of horizontal and vertical integration. Still, it is clear that the system of 
PACs/HALs not only constitutes a new form of transnational governmental network (TGN) 
between participating countries and other stakeholders, but at the same time extends the 
‘reach’ of the European Commission into (sub-)national bureaucracies of EU members and 
partner countries.5 
This briefing note proceeds as follows: After a short discussion of the development of 
Priority Area Coordinators and Horizontal Action Leaders and their function in the 
governance architecture, the methods and results of the online survey conducted 
amongst PAC and HAL from the Baltic Sea and Danube Region in the summer/fall of 
2013 will be presented and discussed. The questionnaire was designed in way to learn 
more about the tasks, patterns of contact and self-perceptions of PAC and HAL in order 
to get a better grasp of their respective roles in administering macro-regional strategies. 
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THE EMERGING GOVERNANCE ARCHITECTURE OF MACRO-REGIONAL STRATEGIES: 
THE ROLE OF PRIORITY AREA COORDINATORS (PAC) AND HORIZONTAL ACTION 
LEADERS (HAL) 
Having been in discussion for about four years and following a stake-holder consultation 
process initiated by the European Commission in 2008, the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea 
Region (EUSBSR), the European Union’s first macro-regional strategy, was announced in 
June 2009. Concomitantly, the first EUSBSR Action Plan released at the same time, 
entrusted the European Commission with a number of tasks referring to “co-ordination, 
monitoring, reporting, facilitation of the implementation and follow-up” (European 
Commission, 2009, 10). Calling for a broader ownership of the Strategy, this document 
did not yet explicitly mention Priority Area Coordinators or Horizontal Action Leaders. It 
was only after the release of the Action Plan and after the European Council had 
endorsed the EUSBSR in October 2009 under the Swedish EU Presidency that the macro-
regional governance structure started to emerge gradually; the Council Review of the 
EUSBSR of June 2012 eventually suggested much more detailed guidance on roles and 
responsibilities. In both Strategies, however, Priority Areas and Horizontal Actions have 
developed along different paths, highly dependent on the political will of core stake-
holders, such as for instance the individuals filling the positions of PACs and HALs. 
There are now 17 Priority Areas and 5 Horizontal Actions in the EUSBSR; 11 priority 
areas have been identified in the EUSDR. Each of these areas and actions is led by at least 
one Priority Area Coordinator or Horizontal Action Leader (see table for EUSBSR 
PACs/HALs in annex). In its most recent Progress Report on the EUSDR, the European 
Commission confirmed that there are “24 Priority Area Coordinators […] driving 
implementation forward” (European Commission, 2013a, 3). Yet, these numbers may be 
subject to fluctuation due to internal rotations or changes of government that may result 
in unexpected vacancies of PAC/HAL positions. The process of designating PACs/HALs 
in both Strategies involved close interaction between Member States and the European 
Commission, with at times the Member States taking the initiative and/or the 
Commission asking some countries to take the lead on a number of specific areas. Most 
Priority Areas and Horizontal Actions involve at least two ‘leaders’, from Member States 
and/or international organizations (see table 1). Some thematic issues such as Health 
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(PA 12) are coordinated by an international body, i.e. the Northern Dimension for Public 
Health and Social Well Being. 
With regard to financing the positions of PACs/HALs, the European Commission 
appropriates up to 120 000 euro for a period of three years to these positions. A report 
on the EUSBSR concluded: “In 2011 each of the PACs had the opportunity to receive 120 
000 euro from the budget allocated by the European Parliament to help implement their 
PA in 2011, 2012 and 2013. The PACs were required to complete a rather detailed 
application form to apply for this funding, which was done by most of them. The 
agreements for receipt of the grant were signed at the end of 2011 and the PACs have 
received an 80% advance payment” (DEABaltika, 2012, 12f). Hence, one may assume 
that this financial ‘kick-off’ provided by the European Commission (through the 
European Parliament) presented an additional incentive for regional activities for 
getting some Member States involved. That said, it still needs to be seen whether or not 
these Member States take into account the roles and functions associated with a PAC in a 
financially sustainable way. 
EUSBSR: On October 27, 2009 the General Affairs Council of the EU (GAERC) 
called upon the “concerned Member States, the Commission and other parties to 
identify coordinators with the role of coordinating and supervising the progress 
of the actions and flagship projects […]” (EU Council, 2009, 5). In terms of core 
tasks, the coordinators are expected to “report on a regular basis to the high-level 
group and the Commission, and in cooperation with the Commission seek to 
identify lead partners for the flagships projects identified within each priority 
area. The lead partners should on a regular basis report to the coordinators” 
(ibid.). Subsequently, the catalogue of functions and duties has been elaborated 
further (see EUSBSR Task Force, 2013). In February 2013 a revised Action Plan 
was launched calling for ‘focal points’ to further streamline the EUSBSR. Another 
major change concerned the introduction of steering groups in the EUSBSR and 
the addition of ‘Culture’ as yet another PA on the demand of the German region of 
Schleswig-Holstein. In addition, a ‘Seed Money Facility’ was introduced to provide 
some start-up funding for project initiatives. Following a small interim 
implementation report in 2010, the first major report was drawn up in June 
2011. The Commission found that the EUSBSR’s overall impact had been 
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successful; in particular, it “has led to concrete action, with a more streamlined 
use of resources. New working methods and networks have been established, and 
many initiatives developed” (European Commission, 2011, 3). Clearly, as the 
EUSBSR was launched in the midst of the 2007–13 funding period, a great deal of 
financial resources had already been earmarked for other projects. Still, a number 
of new projects were launched, such as a project is often referred to as a show 
case, the ‘Baltic Deal’, whereby members would work “with farmers across the 
Region to reduce nutrient run-off, and therefore eutrophication” (European 
Commission, 2011, 2).  
EUSDR: Upon the strong request of Austria, Serbia and Romania as well as the 
preparatory steps of the government of Baden-Württemberg from 2006-20086, 
steps towards the EUSDR were initialed in 2008 by the then EU Commissioner for 
Regional Policy Danuta Hübner. The Commissioner called for a strategy similar to 
the one for the Baltic Sea Area. Many features of the EUSDR Communication, 
Action Plan and governance architecture just built on the EUSBSR model. The 
Commission’s Communication and Action Plan was presented in December 2010. 
In July 2011, the Hungarian EU-Presidency eventually put the EUSDR up on the 
agenda for endorsement by the European Council (see Ágh, 2012). Interestingly, 
in the case of the EUSDR, so-called Steering Groups were put in place from the 
very beginning aiming to bring together experts from ministries, agencies and 
international bodies. 
 
Finally, in 2013, the European Commission carried out an evaluation exercise which 
taped on an extensive survey of more than 100 key stakeholders, as well as independent 
assessments by external experts. The evaluation concludes that macro-regional 
strategies have triggered clear results “evident in terms of projects and more integrated 
policy making, although further improvements are essential in implementation and 
planning” (European Commission, 2013b, 11); yet, at the same time, the “issue of 
leadership” (European Commission, ibid.) is being identified as an important challenge 
to be addressed. It is the objective of this briefing note to contribute towards a better 
understanding of the sociological and organizational underpinnings of leadership issues 
concerning the core of the macro-regional governance architecture established by the 
system of Priority Area Coordinators and Horizontal Action Leaders. 
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METHOD AND DATA 
The paper draws on an online survey7 conducted amongst Priority Area Coordinators 
(PACs) and Horizontal Action Leaders (HALs) of both the EU Strategies for the Baltic Sea 
Region and the Danube Region in summer 2013. Our project was endorsed by one of the 
PACs of the EUSDR, who encouraged his counterparts to take part in the survey, and 
thus provided a peer stamp of approval for the project within the group of PACs. An 
email containing the link to the survey was received by the DR PACs and BSR 
PACs/HALs. After two rounds of reminders, 11 questionnaires from PAC of the EUSDR 
and 20 questionnaires from PAC/HAL from the EUSBSR were harvested. As there are 22 
DR PACs and 41 BSR PACs/HALs, this presents a response rate of 50% in the case of the 
EUSDR and just under half (48.8%) in the case of the EUSBSR. The questionnaire also 
aimed at members of Steering Groups; yet, given to the low response rates we received 
from that surveyed population, and due to the fact that a significant number of Steering 
Groups are still being established (in particular in the context of the EUSBSR), we 
decided to discard them from our analysis. It also seemed that some PACs/HALs found 
that they were not familiar enough with their jobs and responsibilities given the very 
new nature of their respective PA/HA positions.8 Still, given a response rate of (close to) 
50 % in both the EUSBSR and EUSDR, the data builds a rather solid base and provides a 
‘first glimpse’ assessment. Given the annoymous nature of the survey, we do not 
anticipate any significant bias effects related to the answers respondents provided. 
Occassional strong responses against the ‘best’ answer also provide evidence that this is 
the case. 
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UNRAVELLING THE CORE OF THE MACROREGIONAL GOVERNANCE 
ARCHITECTURE: FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
 
1. Demographic background and support infrastructure of PACs and HALs 
Affiliation and fields of training: A majority of surveyed PACs/HALs is employed by a 
national government ministry or agency (BSR PACs/HALs: 62% and DR PACs: 73%) and 
were formally trained in economics/business administration or other disciplines in the 
social sciences. In contrast, almost one of two DR PACs affirms to have a background in 
Engineering, the Natural Sciences or Technology; a number which is down to 15% in the 
case of BSR PACs/HALs. Interestingly, while 65% of BSR PACs/HALs report having studied 
abroad for a period of at least 6 months, only 18% of DR PACs have spent at least some 
time (of at least 6 months) in a foreign country as part of their university training.9 
Becoming a PACs or HALs and future work plans: When it comes to the issue of 
becoming a PAC/HAL, it seems that ‘superiors’ from home institutions have been 
involved rather prominently in more than 50% of cases reported in the survey. 
Irrespectively of wishes by of a superior, 25% of BSR PACs/HALs and 20% of DR PACs 
concede that they have also found job-related tasks attractive. Interestingly, it is 45% of 
BSR PACs/HALs that admit to be “committed to the idea of macro-regional strategies”, but 
only 10% of DR PACs. Ability and expertise were cited as one of the more important 
factors for ‘landing the job’, up to 70% in the case of BSR PACs/HALs and 91% in the 
case of DR PACs. One third of BSR PACs/HALs (35%) perceives principles of seniority as 
yet another important element (only 9% in case of DR PACs). While around 50% of 
survey participants intend to continue work (DR 53% und BR 43%) in the current 
position or with the national government, it is interesting to note that 32% of BSR 
PACs/HALs express their willingness to also consider positions within the European 
Union or other international organizations. This number is about 21% in the case of DR 
PACs. Interestingly, 40% of BSR PACs/HALs and 54% of DR PACs consider their work to be 
beneficial for future career prospects. 
Infrastructure and support: 45% of surveyed PACs and HALs in both the BSR and the 
DR noted that tasks related to their duties amount to no more than 25% of their overall 
work. One out of four PACs/HALs in the BSR (DR: 27%) report that working as a PAC or 
HAL makes up for more than half of a full-time position, and for 15% of BSR PACs/HALs it 
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accounts for even more than 75% (DR: 0%). In short, one can safely assume that PAC/HAL-
related duties come on top of a regular job; however, drawing on the survey data as well 
as insights from face-to-face or telephone interviews with PACs/HALs complementing 
the survey, it seems that in the BSR, there are some trends of professionalization 
discernible within the group of PACs and HALs. Although most PACs and HALs do not 
advocate in favor of a permanent position as PAC or HAL, 45% of BSR PACs/HALs (DR: 
36%) are supportive of the idea of creating full-time positions. This divergence between 
PACs and HALs from the BSR and DR, may also be explained by the fact that 25% of BSR 
PACs/HALs, but only 9% of DR PACs report that they do not have any additional 
personnel – hence the latter, in principle, have some opportunity for delegation. From 
our survey, it seems that 40% of BSR PACs/HALs and 54% of DR PAC are supported by 
2-3 staff (including part time). 
Steering Groups and Focal Area Points constitute yet another important feature of the 
governance architecture of EU macro-regional strategies. Developed first within the 
context of the EUSDR, it has subsequently been adopted in the context of the EUSBSR as 
well. Still, 20% of BSR PAC/HAL acknowledge that Steering Groups have not (yet) been 
put in place; half of existing Steering Groups meet on an biannual basis which seems to 
become standard as it is also the frequency that is common to Steering Groups within 
the DR; here, 91% of PAC confirm that Steering Groups are up and running (one 
surveyed PAC did not provide an answer) and meet at least twice per year. In terms of 
overall membership, PAC/HAL report that national line ministries are strongly 
presented (65% in the case of the BSR, and 90% in the DR). Although attendance in 
Steering Group meetings poses constraints on participating countries and regions, 45% 
of BSR PAC/HAL and DR PAC report a rate of equal or more than 50%.10 
 
2. Role perceptions, tasks and patterns of contact of PACs and HALs 
When asked about role models informing their work, 55% of BSR PACs/HALs and 73% 
DR PACs perceive themselves as representative of their respective macro-regions. 
Whereas 64% of DR PACs admit that they look at themselves as representatives of their 
national governments (BSR PACs/HALs: 40%), BSR PACs/HALs, in terms of their self-
perception, promote a focus on sector policy as they perceive themselves as 
representatives of their respective unit or departments (see table 2). When prompted to 
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consider  several options (see table 3) to depict their work as PAC/HAL, 75% of BSR and 
91% of DR PACs/HALs describe themselves as “information and knowledge provider” 
who “manage the macro-region according to the Action Plan” (65% of PACs/HALs in 
both macro-regions). This is also confirmed by their main preoccupations, which are to 
“provide background information” (63% of BSR and 55% of DR PACs and HALs) as well 
as to “contacting people and networking” (75% of BSR and 73% of DR PACs and HALs). 
These results do not come as a surprise given the fact that the working structure of 
many PACs/HALs is still in a process of consolidation with some minor differences 
between the BSR and DR. 64% of DR PACs affirm that “drafting documents” also makes 
up a significant portion of their time (see table 4). When asked to discern their patterns 
of contacts, national governments certainly prevail in both the case of BSR PACs/HALs 
and DR PACs at a level of 65% and 55%. Interestingly though, Co-PACs/HALs also 
constitute important contact points as 65% (BSR) and 55% (DR) of survey-takers 
confirm. It is striking, however that, while 60% of BSR PACs/HALs identify the European 
Commission as important addressee, only 18% of the DR PACs do so (see table 5). When 
asked how much weight they assign to partners, the European Commission and national 
governments are named as most important ones. Again, Co-PACs are being perceived as 
important interlocutors for both BSR and DR PACs/HALs (see table 6). 
 
3. How PACs/HALs assess opportunities and challenges of the EUSBSR/EUSDR 
When being asked for important obstacles for and benefits of implementing the EUSBSR 
and EUSDR, PACs and HALs (80%) of both macro-regions admit that the lack of financial 
resources is amongst the most important impediments; BSR PACs/HALs are also critical 
a lack of political commitment (80%) amongst participating countries and actors as well 
as deficiency in communicating EUSBSR-related matters (55%). In contrast, DR PACs are 
far more skeptical about the alleged ‘complexity’ (64%) of the governance architecture 
and report that the EUSDR has already contributed to improving the political 
commitment towards the Strategy (82%) (see table 7). One of the key contributions 
according to surveyed PACs and HALs seems to be the fact that over the previous 
months coordination efforts within the respective PAs/HAs have improved, whereas, in 
general, coordination with other actors from the international/EU, member state and 
sub-national levels receive weaker scores (see table 8). With regard to an overall 
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assessment of the EU’s macro-regional strategies to date, an overwhelming majority of 
PACs and HALs agrees that both the EUSBSR and EUSDR are “useful tools to enhance 
regional cooperation and cohesion” (BSR: 95% and DR: 82%) and that they trigger a 
positive impact on the EU (BSR: 75% and DR: 73%). However only about half of 
surveyed PACs and HALs agree in that “macro-regional strategies are a useful tool to 
make better use of structural funding” (BSR: 50% and DR: 55%). Strikingly, 55% of PACs 
and HALs of both macro-regional set-up converge in their impression that “non-EU 
countries have little influence on the PA/HA and SG decision-making process” and diverge 
significantly in subscribing to the idea of a ‘Europe of macro-regions’ (Lithuanian 
Presidency, 2013), which, in principle would see the entire EU territory (as well as 
adjacent neighbourhoods) covered by macro-regional strategies (BSR: 20% and DR: 
73%) (see table 9). It seems fair to conclude that PACs/HALs from the Baltic Sea region 
assume that the rather special historical trajectories for transnational cooperation in 
this part of Europe cannot easily be replicated in other corners of the continent. 
 
DISCUSSION 
Drawing on the results of the survey, it becomes obvious that BSR PACs/HALs and DR 
PACs are quite heterogeneous in terms of their demographic profile; in particular, a 
significantly higher share of BSR PACs/HALs has been able to gain experience abroad as 
part of their university training. Although it is rather difficult to conclude how the 
different curricula and study abroad experiences influences the day-to-day work of PACs 
and HALs, one may assume that the majority of BSR PACs/HALs is more at ease in 
multinational political environments than their DR counterparts with more technical 
skills training.  
Most BSR and DR PACs are government officials that fulfill several roles. Whereas almost 
two thirds of DR PACs conceive themselves as representatives of their national 
governments, BSR PACs/HALs subscribe to a more sectoral perspective on their 
individual portfolios. It is clearly remarkable that 55% of BSR PACs/HALs and 73% DR 
PACs concomitantly look at themselves as representative of their respective macro-
region, although only 10% of DR PAC acknowledge that they “are committed to the idea 
of macro-regional strategies.” This may be interpreted as a significant gap or cognitive 
dissonance between ‘the’ idea of macro-regions and the somewhat more critically 
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received way of implementing it in terms of the ‘EU macro-regional strategy’. DR PACs 
also admit that they find the governance structure overtly complex (see table 7). Both 
groups of PACs and HALs perceive themselves as “information provider” and 
“networkers” which certainly reflects that that both macro-regional strategies are at an 
early stage of implementation. Interestingly again, DR PACs also affirm that the “drafting 
of documents” makes up a significant portion of their working time (see table 4). In 
terms of working time, approximately 45% of surveyed PACs and HALs in both the BSR 
and the DR tell that tasks related to their duties amount to no more than 25% of their 
overall work. With only a few exceptions in the context of the BSR, tasks related to the 
position of PACs and HALs come on top of a regular job – and it is only in the case of the 
BSR PACs/HALs that we become aware of some processes of (full time) 
professionalization. 
When asked to discern their patterns of contacts, national governments certainly prevail 
in both the case of BSR PACs/HALs and DR PACs. 65% (BSR) and 55% (DR) of 
respondents also perceive Co-PACs/HALs as important contact. It is striking, however 
that, while 60% of BSR PACs/HALs identify the European Commission as important 
addressee, only 18% of the DR PACs do so (see table 5). When asked how much weight 
they assign to partners, the European Commission and national governments are named 
as most important ones. Again, Co-PACs are being perceived as important interlocutors 
for both BSR and DR PACs/HALs (see table 6). It is interesting to note that there is a 
strong relationship between a PAC and his or her Co-PACs in a given priority area – and 
it seems that this is one of the central potential entry points for mutual learning effects. 
For example, system of Co-PACs in some of the Priority Areas – e.g. in the PA ‘Energy’ led 
by Latvia and Denmark – seem to have triggered closer forms of consultations and 
cooperation (Interview with PAC, June 3, 2013). It remains to be seen in the future how 
sustainable these relations are and who is primarily benefitting from them. 
The core results of the survey is that horizontal integration centred around the 
individual priority areas or horizontal actions of a PAC/HAL has increased, whereas 
there is no evidence (yet) of closer integration across policy sectors within a given 
macro-region. At the same time, the survey suggests a similar ‘silo-ization effects’ with 
regards to vertical integration across the EU, national and subnational levels. For the 
time being, it remains an important task to ensure that PACs and HALs are supported by 
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well-informed and committed steering groups that would ensure that the Strategy 
extends beyond the inner circles of a prime minister’s or foreign minister’s office dealing 
with EUSBSR/EUSDR matters, or limited to particular personalities and individuals. 
While BSR PACs/HALs come up with particularly high scores of contacts to the 
Commission in terms of communication patterns (in contrast to DR PACs), both BSR 
PACs/HALs and DR identify the Commission as a partner whose arguments they lend 
their ears. Hence it is safe to assume that the European Commission is in a process of 
building up its outreach capacities into this new group of actors in EU territorial 
governance. 
 
CONCLUSION 
As the governance architecture set up by the EUSBSR and the EUSDR is still at a 
relatively early stage of development, it important not only to get a clear picture of the 
demographic background and profile of HALs and PACs which is likely to inform future 
pathways of this new trans-governmental network but also not rush into premature 
conclusions and make radical changes. This said, the survey has clearly demonstrated 
that both BSR PACs/HALs and DR PACs are highly qualified officials of various line 
ministries and regional organisations united in their the ambition to continue their 
current occupations. In a few instances of BSR PACs/HALs, the survey has revealed some 
modest trends of professionalization with regards to more working time allocated to 
PACs/HALs-related task and duties. Let us now turn to those findings of the survey that 
have some far-reaching implications beyond the demographic profile of PACs/HALs: 
First, PACs and HALs serve as key interlocutors of a growing network of EU territorial 
governance mechanisms. In the instances of both the EUSBSR and EUSDR it becomes 
clear, however, that the implementation of the ‘integrated framework’ is very much 
limited to areas within or immediately adjacent to PAs and HAs. Many PACs and HALs 
have not yet been able to reach out horizontally – across sectors – and vertically – across 
layers of governance – involving EU, other international bodies, member states partner 
countries and subnational authorities in a more strategic manner. Or, as put in a recent 
concept note: “Working in the capacity of PAC/HAL implies having to tackle a great deal 
of complexity. Besides, it often takes place in environments characterized by uncertainty 
(e.g. of mandates, agendas, possibilities) and ambiguity (e.g. unclear roles, poor 
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information). Some individuals are better equipped than others for doing the job 
properly.” (Bergström 2013, 2). At the same time, and despite the perceived complexity 
of the structure in some corners of PACs/HALs, it seems that there is now a flexible 
governance architecture in place which may in the near future – provided that it is 
sufficiently supported by the new multiannual financial framework of the EU and 
bolstered by the political commitment of member states and other stake-holders – 
support the emergence of a sustainable trans-governmental network (TGN) capable of 
reaching out to a number of important actors around functionally defined areas of 
cooperation. As this system of governance builds on both sectorial interdependence and 
trans-governmental ties, it is likely to escape what some scholars are expecting for 
“political regional projects such as the Union for the Mediterranean or also broadly 
defined macro-regional approaches”, namely to “fail if they concentrate too strongly on 
the formal intergovernmental level“ (Lavenex, 2013, 3). 
Second, in both macro-regional strategies discussed here the European Commission has 
been received as a core interlocutor – with some differences between the EUSBSR and 
the EUSDR. We perceive this as a clear indication that the EU’s executive branch 
effectively expands its reach into various corners of national and subnational authorities 
of EU member and (to a smaller degree) partner countries. 
Finally, the macro-regional governance architecture needs to account for the specific 
underlying trends of governance in each and every macro-region. It seems that the BSR 
is much more consolidated as a space of and for transnational governance than the DR 
given its established track record of in regional cooperation. In different macro-regions, 
the European Commission (as well as other actors) is compelled to employ different 
strategic approaches, instruments and eventually more active forms of engagement in 
order to achieve the objectives to which the macro-regional strategies subscribe. 
 
Kristiansand/Budapest, February 26, 2014 
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Annex 
Table 1: Priority Areas (PAs) and Horizontal Actions (HAs) of the EUSBSR and 
EUSDR 
Priority Areas (PAs) Coordinator(s) Number of 
PACs/HALs 
EUSDR 
Connecting the Region 
PA Improving mobility and multimodality  
     A To improve mobility and intermodality of inland waterways Austria, Romania 2 
     B To improve mobility and intermodality - rail, road and air Serbia, Slovenia 2 
PA Energy Hungary, Czech Republic 2 
PA Culture and tourism Bulgaria, Romania 2 
Protecting the Environment in the Danube Region 
PA Water quality Hungary, Slovakia 2 
PA Environmental risks Hungary, Romania. 2 
PA Biodiversity, landscapes and the quality of air and soils Bavaria (Germany), Croatia 2 
Building Prosperity in the Danube Region 
PA Knowledge Society Serbia, Slovakia 2 
PA Competitiveness  Baden-Württemberg (Germany), 
Croatia 
2 
PA People and skills Austria, Moldova 2 
Strengthening the Danube Region 
PA Institutional capacity and cooperation City of Vienna (Austria) and 
Slovenia 
2 
Security Germany, Bulgaria 2 
 
EUSBSR 
Save the Sea 
PA Agri – Reinforcing sustainability of agriculture, forestry and fisheries Finland, Lithuania, Sweden 3 
PA Bio – Preserving natural zones and biodiversity, including fisheries Germany 1 
PA Hazards – Reducing the use and impact of hazardous substances Sweden 1 
PA Nutri – Reducing nutrients input to the sea to acceptable levels Finland, Poland 2 
PA Safe – To become a leading region in maritime safety and security Denmark, Finland 2 
PA Secure – Protection from emergencies and accidents on land Sweden, Council of the Baltic 
Sea States (CBSS) 
2 
PA Ship – Becoming a model region for clean shipping Denmark 1 
Connect the Region 
PA Crime – Fighting cross-border crime Finland, Lithuania 2 
PA Energy – Improving the access to, and the efficiency and security of, the energy 
markets 
Denmark, Latvia 2 
PA Transport – Improving internal and external transport links Lithuania, Sweden 2 
Increase Prosperity 
PA Culture – Developing and promoting the common culture and cultural identity Schleswig-Holstein (Germany), 
Poland 
2 
PA Education – Developing innovative education and youth  Hamburg (Germany), Norden 
(Sweden) 
2 
PA Health – Improving and promoting people’s health, including its social aspects Northern Dimension Partnership 
in Public Health and Social Well-
being 
1 
PA Innovation – Exploiting the full potential of the region in research and 
innovation 
Sweden, Poland 3 
PA Internal Market – Removing hindrances of the internal market Estonia 1 
PA SME – Promote entrepreneurship and strengthen the growth of SMEs Denmark 1 
PA Tourism – Reinforcing cohesiveness of the macro-region through tourism Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 1 
Horizontal Actions (HAs) 
HA Involve – Strengthening multilevel governance including involving civil 
society, business and academia 
Region Västerbotten and Kalmar, 
the Baltic Sea NGO network 
2 
HA Neighbours –increase cooperation with neighbouring countries to tackle joint 
challenges in the BSR 
City of Turku (Finland), CBSS 2 
HA Promo – Boosting joint promotion and regional identity building actions Baltic Metropoles Network, 
Baltic Development Forum 
2 
HA Spatial Planning – Encouraging the use of maritime and land-based spatial 
planning in all member states around the Baltic Sea and develop a common 
approach for cross-border cooperation 
VASAB, HELCOM 2 
HA Sustainable development and bio-energy CBSS, Nordic Council of 
Ministers 
2 
Based on European Commission, 2013c, 42  
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Table 2: Which of these models apply to your role as PACs/HALs? 
 BSR PACs/HALs DR PACs 
 
Independent expert 20 27 
Representative of my unit 
and/or department 
50 37 
Representative of my 
country’s government 
40  64 
Representative of my 
region’s government 
10 37 
Representative of my macro-
region 
55 73 
Representative of the 
European Union 
35 28 
In per cent; notes: This table combines the values 1 and 2 (strongly agree, agree) on the 
following five-point scale: (1), (2), (3), (4), (5) – multiple answers possible 
 
Table 3: What describes your work as PACs/HALs best? 
 BSR PAC/HAL DR PAC 
 
Information and knowledge 
provider 
75  91  
Manage the macro-region 
according to Action Plan 
65  65  
Moderate the interests in the 
macro-region 
55  27  
Mediate conflicts in the 
macro-region 
20  0  
Advocate of the MR 
 
50 64 
In per cent; notes: This table combines the values 1 and 2 (strongly agree, agree) on the 
following five-point scale: (1), (2), (3), (4), (5) – multiple answers possible 
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Table 4: PACs/HALs spending much time on the following issues 
 BSR PAC/HAL 
 
DR PAC 
Drafting documents 
 
45 64 
Providing scientific, 
technical, legal advice 
21  18 
Giving general advice 
 
55  36 
Providing background 
information 
63 55 
Meeting/contacting people 
and networking 
75 73 
Project development and 
management 
45 32 
Finding financial resources 
 
25 18 
In per cent; notes: This table combines the values 1 and 2 (strongly agree, agree) on the 
following five-point scale: (1), (2), (3), (4), (5) – multiple answers possible 
 
Table 5: Patterns of contacts – PACs/HALs having much contact through meetings, 
e-mails, phone, etc. 
 BSR PAC/HAL 
 
DR PAC 
European Commission 60 18 
Other EU institutions 15 9 
National contact points 40 36 
Co-PAC/HAL 65 54 
Other PACs/HALs (from 
your own EU macro-region) 
50 27 
Other PACs/HALs (from 
other EU macro-region) 
0 0 
Members of Steering Group 
(own priority/action) 
50 18 
Members of Steering Group 
(other priority/action) 
5  0 
Civil society 45 18 
National government 65 55 
Subnational authorities 55  46 
Municipal authorities 25 9 
IOs in macro-regions  50 18 
Universities/research inst. 45 27 
In per cent; notes: This table combines the values 1 and 2 (a lot, quite a lot) on the 
following five-point scale: (1), (2), (3), (4), (5) – multiple answers possible  
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Table 6: Appreciation of partners – PACs and HALs assigning weight to the 
arguments/advice of the following 
 BSR 
PACs/HALs 
DR PACs 
 
European Commission 100 91 
Other EU institutions 40 55 
National contact points 70 70 
Co-PAC/HAL 80 73 
Other PACs/HALs (from your own EU macro-region) 55 64 
Other PACs/HALs (from other EU macro-region) 15 27 
Members of Steering Group (own priority/action) 65 82 
Members of Steering Group (other priority/action) 15 18 
Civil society 40 46 
National government 90 91 
Subnational authorities 40 40 
Municipal authorities 30 18 
International organizations in macro-regions (e.g. 
HELCOM, ICPDR, etc.) 
70 64 
Universities/research institutes 50 55 
In per cent; notes: This table combines the values 1 and 2 (a lot, quite a lot) on the 
following five-point scale: (1), (2), (3), (4), (5) – multiple answers possible 
 
Table 7: Most important obstacles and benefits in the implementation of the 
Macro-regional Strategy according to PACs and HALs 
 BSR 
PACs/HALs 
DR PACs 
 
Obstacles   
Lack of financial resources 80 80 
Lack of political commitment 80 55 
Deficiency in communication 55 37 
Complexity 30 64 
Lack of expertise 0 18 
Lack of interest among the 
stakeholders/multipliers/general public 
35 37 
Benefits   
Increase of political commitment, sense of ownership 55 82 
Raised awareness of macro-regional needs 65 73 
Improvement of quality of project proposals 50 27 
Improvement of implementation of projects 40 27 
Improvement of absorption of funds 25 18 
In per cent; notes: This table combines the values 1 and 2 (strongly agree, agree) on the 
following five-point scale: (1), (2), (3), (4), (5) – multiple answers possible 
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Table 8: Discernibility of impact of (and tensions within) macro-regional 
governance architecture according to PACs and HALs 
 BSR 
PACs/HALs 
DR PACs 
 
Within your priority area/horizontal action 
 
60 82 
Between the priority areas/horizontal actions 30 46 
With European institutions 35 27 
With other organizations 20 27 
With national administrations 25 36 
With regional administrations 20 18 
With local administrations 5 0 0 
Governance architecture within your priority 
area/horizontal action 
45 55 
Governance architecture in general 40 27 
Conflict between PA 5 0 
Conflict SG/WG 5 0 
Conflict different stakeholders 0 10 
Conflict with EU 0 0 
Conflict regional government 0 0 
Conflict national government 15 9 
Tensions generally 30 18 
In per cent; notes: This table combines the values 1 and 2 (a lot, quite a lot) on the 
following five-point scale: (1), (2), (3), (4), (5) – multiple answers possible 
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Table 9: Overall assessment of Macro-regional Strategies 
 BSR 
PACs/HALs 
DR PACs 
 
Macro-regional Strategies are a useful tool to tool to 
enhance regional cooperation and cohesion 
95 82 
Macro-regional Strategies are a useful tool to make 
better use of structural funding 
50 55 
Macro-regional Strategies should cover the whole “EU-
Territory” 
20 73 
Macro-regional Strategies should have their own 
funding resources 
65 73 
Macro-regional Strategies will improve EU governance 
 
75 73 
The implementation of Macro-Regional Strategies will 
be enhanced within the new 2014-2020 period 
70 73 
The decision making process is mainly influenced by 
the interests of the “old” (prior to 2004) EU Members 
15 27 
The “new” (post 2004] EU Member States have little 
influence on the PA/HA and SG decision-making  
10 18 
The non-EU countries have little influence on the 
PA/HA and SG decision-making process 
55 55 
Macro-regional strategies have overall a positive impact 
on the unity of the European Union 
75 73 
In per cent; notes: This table combines the values 1 and 2 (strongly agree, agree) on the 
following five-point scale: (1), (2), (3), (4), (5) – multiple answers possible 
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Table 4: PACs/HALs spending much time on the following issues 
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Table 5: Patterns of contacts – PACs/HALs having much contact through meetings, 
e-mails, phone, etc. 
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National contact points 40 36 
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other EU macro-region) 
0 0 
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European Commission 100 91 
Other EU institutions 40 55 
National contact points 70 70 
Co-PAC/HAL 80 73 
Other PACs/HALs (from your own EU macro-region) 55 64 
Other PACs/HALs (from other EU macro-region) 15 27 
Members of Steering Group (own priority/action) 65 82 
Members of Steering Group (other priority/action) 15 18 
Civil society 40 46 
National government 90 91 
Subnational authorities 40 40 
Municipal authorities 30 18 
International organizations in macro-regions (e.g. 
HELCOM, ICPDR, etc.) 
70 64 
Universities/research institutes 50 55 
In per cent; notes: This table combines the values 1 and 2 (a lot, quite a lot) on the 
following five-point scale: (1), (2), (3), (4), (5) – multiple answers possible 
 
Table 7: Most important obstacles and benefits in the implementation of the 
Macro-regional Strategy according to PACs and HALs 
 BSR 
PACs/HALs 
DR PACs 
 
Obstacles   
Lack of financial resources 80 80 
Lack of political commitment 80 55 
Deficiency in communication 55 37 
Complexity 30 64 
Lack of expertise 0 18 
Lack of interest among the 
stakeholders/multipliers/general public 
35 37 
Benefits   
Increase of political commitment, sense of ownership 55 82 
Raised awareness of macro-regional needs 65 73 
Improvement of quality of project proposals 50 27 
Improvement of implementation of projects 40 27 
Improvement of absorption of funds 25 18 
In per cent; notes: This table combines the values 1 and 2 (strongly agree, agree) on the 
following five-point scale: (1), (2), (3), (4), (5) – multiple answers possible 
 
Table 8: Discernibility of impact of (and tensions within) macro-regional 
governance architecture according to PACs and HALs 
 BSR 
PACs/HALs 
DR PACs 
 
Within your priority area/horizontal action 
 
60 82 
Between the priority areas/horizontal actions 30 46 
With European institutions 35 27 
With other organizations 20 27 
With national administrations 25 36 
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With regional administrations 20 18 
With local administrations 5 0 0 
Governance architecture within your priority 
area/horizontal action 
45 55 
Governance architecture in general 40 27 
Conflict between PA 5 0 
Conflict SG/WG 5 0 
Conflict different stakeholders 0 10 
Conflict with EU 0 0 
Conflict regional government 0 0 
Conflict national government 15 9 
Tensions generally 30 18 
In per cent; notes: This table combines the values 1 and 2 (a lot, quite a lot) on the 
following five-point scale: (1), (2), (3), (4), (5) – multiple answers possible 
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Table 9: Overall assessment of Macro-regional Strategies 
 BSR 
PACs/HALs 
DR PACs 
 
Macro-regional Strategies are a useful tool to tool to 
enhance regional cooperation and cohesion 
95 82 
Macro-regional Strategies are a useful tool to make 
better use of structural funding 
50 55 
Macro-regional Strategies should cover the whole “EU-
Territory” 
20 73 
Macro-regional Strategies should have their own 
funding resources 
65 73 
Macro-regional Strategies will improve EU governance 
 
75 73 
The implementation of Macro-Regional Strategies will 
be enhanced within the new 2014-2020 period 
70 73 
The decision making process is mainly influenced by 
the interests of the “old” (prior to 2004) EU Members 
15 27 
The “new” (post 2004] EU Member States have little 
influence on the PA/HA and SG decision-making  
10 18 
The non-EU countries have little influence on the 
PA/HA and SG decision-making process 
55 55 
Macro-regional strategies have overall a positive impact 
on the unity of the European Union 
75 73 
In per cent; notes: This table combines the values 1 and 2 (strongly agree, agree) on the 
following five-point scale: (1), (2), (3), (4), (5) – multiple answers possible 
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Endnotes 
*Associate Professor at the Department of Development Studies, University of Agder 
(stefan.ganzle@uia.no) Ph.D. student at the Department of Political Science, Andrássy 
University, Budapest (wulf@ycdn.eu). The authors promised PACs/HALs and members 
of Steering Groups and Focal Groups of the EUSBSR and EUSDR to share the results of 
the survey with them. The authors also wish to thank Ryan Cross (UBC Vancouver), 
Professor Jarle Trondal (UiA/UiO) and Thomas Henökl (UiA) for help and comments on 
the questionnaire as well as the briefing note. All remaining mistakes remain those of 
the authors. 
 
1 On December 14, 2012, the European Council called upon the Commission to elaborate “subject to the 
evaluation of the concept of macro-regional strategies […] a new EU Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian region 
before the end of 2014” (European Council, 2012, 11). On May 15, 2013, the European Parliament adopted a 
resolution in support of an Alpine macro-regional strategy (European Parliament, 2013), and the European 
Council of Council of December 20, 2013 eventually invited “the Commission, in cooperation with Member 
States, to elaborate an EU Strategy for the Alpine Region by June 2015” (European Council, 2013, 25). In the 
same vein, the European Parliament, at its plenary meeting on October 23, 2013, endorsed approved a budget 
line of €250.000 in 2014 for a preparatory action to study the feasibility of a North Sea Strategy. 
2
 In the case of the EUSDR, the objectives are to (1) connect the region, (2) protect the environment, (3) build 
prosperity and (4) strengthen the Danube region – primarily in terms of institutional capacity and cooperation.  
3
 According to Radaelli/Dunlop (2013, 930) the core feature of experimentalist governance is “to connect 
different actors in multi-level networks that monitor, diffuse information on policy performance and generate 
feedback. Instruments like annual reporting and peer review create the necessary informational conditions for 
monitorability. Socialization in multi-level networks creates opportunities for exchanging and adapting local 
solutions found in one place to another place.” 
4
 We are grateful to Jarle Trondal for drawing our attention to this body of literature. 
5
 At the same time, it should be born in mind that the Commission’s DG region is rather thinly staffed: “In terms 
of human resources, two national experts, one and a half EC staff plus an assistant work with EUSBSR issues in 
the Commission. […] In addition, one person works with EUSBSR issues on a full-time basis at INTERACT 
Point Turku and some work has also been done for the Strategy by other staff members that in total would 
constitute half of one full-time staff position” (DEABaltika, 2012, 13). 
6
 It is also important to mention the various efforts of the city of Ulm in Baden-Württemberg since 1998 to bring 
up the issue of collaboration along the river Danube onto the international agenda. 
7
 The survey tool was provided by limelight. 
8
 One BSR HAL posited in a written correspondence: “Being HAL [anonymous], however, I entered your 
questionnaire, but quickly realized that the survey is too early for me, and gave up. We are only just about to 
establish a Co-ordination Group [anonymous]. I believe many PACs and HALs might feel the same. You should 
give us more time!” (author’s correspondence, September 19, 2013). 
9
 Some of the key findings are in italics. 
10
 In 53% of instances in the BSR (73% in the DR), specialists and observers have been invited to the Steering 
Groups. 
